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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
El\tlPLOYERS RESOURCE MANAGEJ\1ENT COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
-vs-

l\1EGAN RONK, in her capacity as Director of the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant/Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District Court
for Ada County, State of Idaho
The Honorable Samuel Hoagland, District Judge Presiding
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2014, the Idaho Legislature enacted

Idaho Reimbursement Incentive

which

delegated authority to an Economic Advisory Council C'EAC") within the Idaho Department of
Commerce to grant tax subsidies to businesses that established an office in Idaho and created at
least 20 new jobs. Under the Act, the EAC is granted broad discretion to grant or deny tax
credits to businesses; the Act also strictly limits judicial review of agency action.
In 2016, the EAC granted a tax credit of $6.5 million to Paylocity, an Illinois
Corporation. Paylocity is a direct competitor of Employers Resource Management Company, an
Idaho Corporation ("Employers"). By providing a $6.5 million government subsidy to Paylocity,
the EAC will cover a substantial portion of Paylocity's overhead and operating expenses, giving
Paylocity a competitive advantage over Employers in attracting and servicing Idaho business.
To compete with Paylocity, Employers will have to match or beat the fees Paylocity charges for
its services, but without the benefit of a multi-million dollar government subsidy.
Employers filed this lawsuit, asserting standing as a business "competitor" aggrieved by
arbitrary executive agency action, to challenge the Legislature's delegation of discretionary
authority to the EAC to issue tax credits to selected Idaho businesses.
The Idaho Constitution empowers the Legislature, and it alone, to create tax policy for
the state of Idaho and ensure the uniform application of Idaho's tax laws. The Legislature can
delegate the administration of tax laws to executive agencies. However, by authorizing the EAC
to waive taxes levied on selected companies, without strictly limiting the discretion that EAC
selecting those companies, and by limiting judicial review

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

the EAC's

'"""'~h,,,v

This appeal is taken from an order granting the Defendant's '""""" to
standing and judgment thereon. Employers filed its Complaint on March

-,.J,uu,.,

for

2016. Defendant

Megan Ronk is the Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce and was named in her
official capacity in the Complaint On May 4, 2016, the Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss
for lack of standing. On May 20, 2016, Employers filed its Opposition to the Defendant's motion.
The Defendant's Reply Memorandum was filed on July 15, 2016. The Court set the motion for
hearing on July 20, 2016. Employers filed a Motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint on
May 26, 2016. At the hearing on July 20, 2016, the District Court granted ERMC's Motion to
file an Amended Complaint On July 26, 2016, the Order granting

to file an amended

complaint was entered by the Court and Employer's Amended Complaint was filed. On August
1, 2016, the Defendant renewed its Motion to Dismiss and a hearing was held on August 2, 2016.

At that hearing, the State objected to the inclusion of Paragraph 10 and the attached
Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint, which the Court struck. At the conclusion of the hearing
on the State's Motion to Dismiss, the Court took the matter under advisement and rendered its
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing on August
15, 2016. A judgment of dismissal was entered on August 15, 2016, from which this Appeal was
taken. Notice of Appeal was filed and served on September 19, 2016.

B. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Article III, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides: "The legislative power of the state shall
vested in a senate and
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that

l

state
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no
person or collection of persons charged with the
of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary authority of
the Legislature is not delegable, and

Idaho Constitution forbids a delegation of unrestricted

and unguided taxing power.
The Legislature exercises its taxing power subject to

Article VII, §5 of the Idaho

Constitution, which states that "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects[and]
the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as shall seem
necessary and just
The Idaho Department

Commerce is an agency within

Idaho

State Governrnent Pursuant to Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution, all agencies within the
executive branch are prohibited from exercising any of the powers reserved to the legislative or
the judicial branch

Idaho State Government

In 2014, the Idaho Legislature passed the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act ("IRV\"),
which was then amended in 2015. The IRIA authorizes tax credits to be issued by the Director of
the Department of Commerce to a qualified business entity.

qualify for the tax credit, a

business entity files an application with the Department of Commerce. The application is
reviewed by the Director to determine if all the information required by the statute is present.
The completed application is then reviewed by an Economic Advisory
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within

business entity
claim a
tax credit
a
number
of new jobs in the state of Idaho. In order to be considered
participation, an
applicant or its designated representative must submit an application to
director
and shall include:
(a) A complete description of the proposed project and the economic benefit that
will accrue to the state as a result of the project;
(b) A description or explanation of whether the project will occur or how it will be
altered if the tax credit application is denied by the council;
(c) Proof of a community match;
(d) A letter from the tax commission confirming that the applicant is in good
standing in the state of Idaho and is not in unresolved arrears in the payment of
any state tax or fee administered by the tax commission;
(e) A detailed statement with an estimate of Idaho goods and services to be
consumed or purchased by the applicant during the term;
(f) Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries the state;
(g) An anticipated project inception date and proposed schedule of progress;
(h) Proposed performance requirements and measurements that must be met prior to
issuance of the tax credit;
(i) A detailed description of the proposed capital investment;
G) A detailed description of jobs to be created, an approximation of the number of
suchjobs to be created and the projected average wage to be paid for such jobs;
(k) A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be generated by
the project;
(l) Identification of any individual or entity included within the application that is
entitled to a rebate pursuant to section 63-3641 or 63-4408, Idaho Code, or is
required to obtain a separate seller's permit pursuant to chapter 36, title 63,
Idaho Code; and
(m)The federal employer identification or social security number for each individual
or entity stated as the business entity in the agreement
Upon satisfaction by the director that all requirements are met pursuant to this
chapter, the director shall submit such application to the council [Economic Advisory
Council]. The council shall review the application, may request additional
information and shall approve or reject the application. An approval or rejection from
the council shall not be considered a contested case pursuant to chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prohibit an
aggrieved applicant from seeking judicial review as provided in chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code.
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a tax
the

application,

the Department of Commerce, is the creation of

,n~A.-rM~~,An

to

jobs." In order to claim the

tax credit, an entity must create a minimum number of new jobs in the state of Idaho. "Minimum
new jobs" is defined in Idaho Code §67-4738(11) as "not less

twenty (20) such jobs over

the term of the project if created within a rural community, or not less than fifty (50) such jobs
over the term of the project if created within an urban community."
Idaho Code §67-4739(1)(a) - (m) specifies information required to be provided as part
of the tax credit application process. However, in enacting this statute, the Idaho Legislature did
not establish standards, guidelines, or requirements as to how or
process

information is to be

approving an application for issuance of a tax credit Further, the statute

disapproval of an applicant's request for a tax credit Without standards
subjective

-- in place,

objective or even

decisions of the EAC are, for all practical purposes, exempt from

meaningful substantive review by the judicial branch of Idaho State Government
Idaho Code §67-4739 gives the EAC discretion to grant or

an application based on

its subjective determination of a business's qualifications. The only requirement that is even
potentially objective is the required number of "new jobs" that a
qualify for the tax

But even that requirement is subject to

Department's determination

that the jobs are in fact "new" and not simply renamed or artificially generated in some other
What is more to the point is that creating
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is not

that will accrue to the state as a result
Proof of a community match;
KnmNn or expected detriments to the state or "''"~,a,,., industries in
the state;
A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be
generated by the project.
V'"''"'" ... "

While the Code specifies the categories of information that are to be provided, no
standards, guidelines, or rules are set out as to how the information is to be used or evaluated by
the EAC.

Its determination as to whether an applicant is entitled to a tax credit is totally

subjective and within the EAC's administrative discretion. It is therefore not subject to any
meaningful judicial review.
conclusion that an entity qualifies for a tax
capricious,

is at once arbitrary and

that the EAC alone evaluates all of the information submitted, without any

required objective criteria for that evaluation, and without

findings of fact to

support its decision. Thus, the EAC has virtually unlimited discretion to grant or deny any
business's application, regardless of the quality and content of the information submitted.
Idaho Code §§67-4704(1) and (2) limit the duty of the Director
Commerce to determining whether the application is complete.

it

the Department

the Director must submit

the application to the EAC, whose decision to grant or deny a tax credit is conclusive.
Although provision has been made for judicial review

a rejected application by the

applicant, the law provides that a denial is not considered a "contested case, and the
law with regard to appeal of an administrative agency decision

OPENING BRIEF

the court to defer to the

a

entity create

Even as to

one

however, the Idaho Legislature failed to

enact any "standards, guidelines,

restrictions or qualifications" in the IRJA. As a result, the

is the final arbiter with regard to

whether an entity qualifies for or is denied favorable tax treatment.

Without any objective

standards and requirements, the exercise of EAC's grant of authority is subject to political
favoritism, corruption and cronyism.
Plaintiff Employers

Resource

Management

Company,

an

Idaho

Corporation

("Employers"), is one of Idaho's top privately-held companies. Recently, the EAC granted one of
Employer's competitors, Paylocity, an Illinois company, a 28% credit against
liabilities

future tax

return for its promise to create "new jobs" in Boise. The estimated tax credit granted

to Paylocity by the EAC is approximately $6,500,000.
The State of Idaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it an unfair
economic advantage over Employers, including the ability to lure employees away from
Employers. Employers has and will suffer damages as a direct and proximate result of the
actions of the State Department of Commerce alleged herein. Those damages include
following:
a) Paylocity is a web-based company. In ar1ticipation of the web
requirements to effectively compete against Paylocity in Idaho,
Employers has incurred additional expenses for internet
competitive software;
b) Since Paylocity's receipt of tax credits is based in part on the
number of employees it hires, Employers expects that its key
their
employees will be targeted by Paylocity because
..... ,,,,,.1"', experience, and
existing
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will incur additional expenses
expenses to retain
clients,
amount charged for its services to compete with Paylocity.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erred in its interpretation and application of
"competitor standing" in this case.

2. Whether Employers established its standing in this action by alleging an injury
in fact, fairly traceable to the action of the Economic Advisory Council,
redressable by this action.
D. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution provides that "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon
same class of subjects

[and] the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from

time to time as shall seem necessary and just
Idaho State Government cannot interfere with the private market to un-level the playing
field to favor one business at the expense of its competitors. The Idaho Constitution empowers
the Legislature to enact exemptions that encourage competition in the marketplace.

But

government cannot selectively legislate tax breaks for favored companies. It cannot pick winners
and losers among businesses. The Legislature has constitutional authority to enact tax laws that
benefit businesses generally.

But it cannot delegate that constitutional authority to an

administrative agency by granting it unfettered discretion to choose which company benefits
from tax breaks.
The Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act ("IRIA") does precisely that The Legislature

OPENING BRIEF

Employers is one of Idaho's top
employee benefit

privately held businesses, providing corporations with

Paylocity, an Illinois business offering similar

received a

$6.5 million tax credit for agreeing to relocate its business to Idaho and compete with Employers
for the same pool of business. The EAC's action in granting a tax credit to Paylocity allows it to
provide the same services that Employers already provides at a substantially reduced cost,
putting Employers at a severe competitive disadvantage.

II.
ARGUMENT
A. EMPLOYERS HAS STANDING TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE STATE'S
SUBSIDIZATION OF ITS BUSINESS COMPETITOR
L Employers has suffered an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the EAC's action in
granting a tax subsidy to Paylocity, its business competitor.

Employers initiated this lawsuit because the Idaho Department of Commerce exercised
its discretionary authority under the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Act to grant a subsidy in the
form of a tax credit to Paylocity, a direct competitor of Employers. The Complaint also alleges
of

granting that tax credit will directly

by giving

Paylocity an unfair economic advantage over Employers, which it can use to undercut
Employer's pricing, lure its employees away, and can devote its tax savings to marketing and
advertising expenses to compete for Employer's customers. (Clerk's Record "CR" p. 65,

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

statute
validity
the ... statute, . . and obtain
a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.

"[t]he [Uniform] Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from
showing that it has standing to bring the action in the first instance. Schneider v. Howe, 142
Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006).
The standard for standing was set forth in Young v. City of Ketchum, I
Idaho 1

103, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 ( 2002):
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues
the party wishes to have adjudicated. Van Valkenburgh at 124, 15
P.3d at 11
Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128
Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (quoting A1iles at 639,
778 P.2d at 761). To satisfy the case or controversy requirement
standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and
a substantial likelihood the relief
requested will prevent or
redress the claimed injury. Id (citations omitted). This requires a
showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged
conduct ~Miles at 639, 778 P.2d at 761 (internal quotations
omitted).

A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under LR.C.P. I2(b)(6)
only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the
claim which would entitle it to relief. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346,
1347 (Ct App. 1992). As a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be
granted only in the unusual case in which the complaint includes allegations showing on the
the complaint that there is some insunnountable bar to relief. Id.
ultimately

but whether the

BRIEF

is

to

is not whether the
to

Employers alleged facts in

Complaint that met

jurisdictional requirements for

standing.
C. EMPLOYERS HAS COMPETITOR STANDING BASED ON INJURY
RESULTING FROM THE AGENCY'S ACTION THAT BENEFITTED ITS
COMPETITOR.

The lower court ruled that Employers did not have standing because (1) Employers did
not have a protected legal interest in the marketplace; (2) the government action was directed at
third parties, for the purpose of increasing competition, and not at

and (3) Employers

alleged only a
With regard to the holding (1) that Employers did not have a ''protectable legal interest in
marketplace" because the tax credit granted to Paylocity did not directly injure Employers,
(CR, p. 81, Afemorandum Decision, p. 6), there are a number of problems. First, whether
Paylocity's receipt

a tax credit will cause economic injury to Employers is a question of fact

that has yet to be litigated. Second, the test for standing is whether an injury in fact is "fairly
traceable to the actions of the government," not whether the government action is directed at the
injured party. Third, the question whether Employers has a protectable legal interest goes to the
merits, not to the issue of standing, as noted in Sherley v Sebellius, 610 F.3d 69,
2010), vacated on other grounds by 644 F.3d 388:
The requirement of a protected competitive interest, however "goes
to the merits" of a plaintiff's claim, not to his Article III standing.
Data
Serv.
US.

BRIEF

(D.C. Cir.

courts

held that the aggrieved business may assert
to the district court's ruling in

directed at the complaining party to be actionable, "competitor standing" has been successfully
asserted with regard to agency action directed at a plaintiff's competitor. The court in Sherley v.
Sebelius, supra at 72, declared:

The doctrine of competitor standing addresses the first requirement
by recognizing that economic actors " suffer [an] injury in fact
when agencies lift regulatory restrictions on their competitors or
otherwise allow increased competition" against them. La. Energy
& Power Auth v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.CCirJ998);
accord New World Radio, Inc. v.
294
164, 172
(D.C.Cir.2002) ("basic law of economics" that increased
competition leads to actual injury); see also Canadian Lumber
1319, I
Alliance v. United States, 517
(Fed.Cir.2008) (doctrine of competitor standing " relies on
economic logic to conclude that a plaintiff will likely suffer an
injury-in-fact when the government acts in a way that increases
The form of
competition or aids the plaintiffs competitors" ).
that injury may vary; for example, a seller facing increased
competition may lose sales to rivals, or be forced to lower its price
or to expend more resources to achieve the same sales, all to the
detriment of its bottom line. Because increased competition
almost surely injures a seller in one form or another, he need not
wait until "allegedly illegal transactions ... hurt [him}
competitively" before challenging the regulatory (or, for that
matter, the deregulatory) governmental decision that increases
competition. La. Energy, 141 F.3d at 367 (emphasis added).
Moreover, while increasing competition in general may be a laudable goal, an agency
cannot pursue that goal by granting preferences to some businesses based on subjective criteria.

BRIEF

an Idaho company harmed
competitors. In Clinton v. City of New York,

action on tax policy that benefitted
41

426-27, 118

s.

2091 (1998), the

Court held that Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., an Idaho cooperative, had "competitor
standing" to challenge the President's cancellation of a tax benefit that put Snake River at a
disadvantage with its competitors. The Supreme Court discussed the application of the doctrine
to Snake River as follows:
Appellee Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. (Snake River) was
formed in May 1997 to assist Idaho potato farmers in marketing
their crops and stabilizing prices, in part through a strategy of
acquiring potato processing facilities that will allow the members
of the cooperative to retain revenues otherwise payable to thirdparty processors. At that time, Congress was considering the
amendment to the capital gains tax that was expressly intended to
aid farmers· cooperatives in the purchase of processing
and Snake River had concrete plans to take advantage of the
amendment if passed. Indeed, appellee Mike Cranney, acting on
behalf of Snake River, was engaged in negotiations with the owner
of an Idaho potato processor that would have qualified for the tax
benefit under the pending legislation, but these negotiations
terminated when the President canceled §968. Snake River is
currently considering the possible purchase of other processing
facilities in Idaho if the President's cancellation is reversed. Based
on these facts, the District Court concluded that the Snake River
plaintiffs were injured by the President's cancellation of §968, as
they "lost the benefit of being on equal footing with their
competitors and will likely have to pay more to purchase
processing facilities now that the sellers will not [be] able to take
advantage of section 968's tax breaks. Id., at 177. City of New York
v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 177 (D.D.C. 1998).
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The Snake River
also suffered an immediate
injury when the President canceled the limited tax benefit that
Congress had enacted to facilitate the acquisition
processing
plants. Three critical facts identify the:; specificity and the:;
importance of that injury. First, Congress enacted § 968 for the
specific purpose of providing a benefit to a defined category of
potential purchasers of a defined category of assets. The members
of that statutorily defined class received the equivalent of a
statutory "bargaining chip" to use in carrying out the congressional
plan to facilitate their purchase of such assets. Second, the
President selected §968 as one of only two tax benefits in the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that should be canceled. The
cancellation rested on his determination that the use of those
bargaining chips would have a significant impact on the federal
budget deficit. Third, the Snake River cooperative was organized
for the very purpose of acquiring processing facilities, it had
concrete plans to utilize the benefits of §968, and it was engaged in
ongoing negotiations with the owner of a processing plant who had
expressed an interest in structuring a tax-deferred sale when the
President canceled § 968. Moreover, it is actively searching for
other processing facilities for possible future purchase if the
President's cancellation is reversed; and there are ample processing
facilities in the State that Snake River may be able to purchase. By
depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation
inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish
standing under our precedents. See, e. g., Investment Company
Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971); 3K. Davis & R.
Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 13-14 (3d ed. 1994) ("The
Court routinely recognizes probable economic injury resulting
from {governmental actions} that alter competitive conditions as
sufficient to satisfy the {Article III 'injury-in-fact' requirement/ .
. . .fi}t follows logically that any ... petitioner who is likely to
suffer economic injury as a result of [governmental action/ that
changes market conditions satisfies this part of the standing
test''). (emphasis added)
Id at 432-33.
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therefore eligible
~,u-~,~ ..~·-

telecommunication services in competition with USTA.

court stated:

UST A contends that the FCC's order injures its members by
making ICN eligible for a subsidy that permits it to offer lower
prices for the same telecommunications services. We
have
repeatedly recognized that parties "suffer constitutional injury in
fact when agencies . . allow increased competition" against them.
Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367
(D.C. Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Wabash Valley Power Ass'n v. FERC,
268 F.3d 1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir.2001); MD Phann., Inc. v. Drug
Eriforcement Admin., 133 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1998). And we
have likewise recognized that regulatory decisions that permit
subsidization of some participants in a market can have the
requisite injurious impact on those participants' competitors. See
Exxon
v. FERC, 182 F.3d 30, 43
1999);
Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d at 701.
case was decided by summary
judgment on the pleadings, USTA had submitted member affidavits showing that it was
willing and able to compete with ICN. The court remarked that these affidavits were sufficient to
the remaining two requirements of constitutional standing,"~"''"""'
[T]he competitive injury suffered by USTA's members is fairly
traceable to the FCC's decision to render ICN eligible for the
subsidy, and that iajury would likely be redressed by a favorable
decision of this court vacating the FCC's order. See High Plains
2002); Exxon,
Wireless, LP. v. FCC, 276 F.3d 599, 605 (D.C.
182 F.3d at 43; Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d at 701. We therefore
conclude that USTA has constitutional standing to seek judicial
review of the order on behalf of its members.
Id.at1331
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it
against it would increase and that it would be harmed.
of Appeals rejected this limitation on standing in Sherley

a

Federal

Sebelius, supra:

This mere possibility of injury does not establish competitor
standing, argues the Government, which, as did the district court,
reads our cases to require that a plaintiff asserting competitor
standing show a challenged agency action will "almost surely
cause [him] to lose business." El Paso, 50 F.3d at 27.
As the parties' arguments demonstrate, our cases addressing
competitor standing have articulated various formulations of the
standard for determining whether a plaintiff asserting competitor
standing has been injured. Regardless how we have phrased the
standard in any particular case, however, the basic requirement

common to all our cases is that the complainant show an
actual or imminent increase in competition, which increase we
recognize will almost certainly cause an injury in fact
610 F.3d at

(emphasis added).

The district court below rendered its decision based on the pleadings.
were considered by the court. In its Complaint

affidavits or

Amended Complaint,

Employers alleged that the agency's grant of a tax credit to Paylocity, its competitor, would
increase competition for business on terms favorable to Paylocity and unfavorable to Employers,
which constituted an imminent and actual threatened injury.
Employers alleged:
1. Plaintiff Employers Resource Management
an Idaho
Corporation, ("Employers Resource") is one of Idaho's top privately-held
companies. Recently, the EAC granted Paylocity, an Illinois company,
and one
Employers' Resource competitors, a
against
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3. Employers Resource has and will suffer damages as a direct and
of the actions
State Department
proximate
Commerce alleged herein. Those damages include the following:
a) Paylocity is a web-based company. In anticipation of the
web requirements to effectively
compete
against
Paylocity in Idaho, Employers Resource has incurred
additional expenses for internet competitive software;
b) Since Paylocity's receipt of tax credits is based in part on
the number of employees it hires, Employers Resource
expects that its key employees will be targeted by Paylocity
because of their training, experience, and familiarity with
Employers' existing Idaho customer base. Employers will
incur additional expense in salaries and other benefits to
retain its key employees;
Employers anticipates the need to protect
Idaho business since Paylocity can afford to undercut
Employers' pricing, in part due to
favorable tax
treatment. Employers will incur expenses advertising and
marketing expenses to retain its clients.
(CR., pp. 41-42).
The Federal Court of Appeals held in Sherley that the two doctors had competitor
standing when the agency promulgated new guidelines that authorized the agency to fund more
action was not directed at

two

suffered an

"injury in fact" because the agency action meant increased competition for a limited number of
grants. Just like those two doctors, Employers will clearly face increased competition in Idaho
from Paylocity's entry into the marketplace with government assistance. That fact satisfies the
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to

not

the plaintiff had "competitor standing.

However, in virtually every other
courts.

Idaho's legal standard for standing is set out in Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128
Idaho

, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996). The Court noted:
In Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d
(1989),
the Court stated three basic propositions concerning standing that
guide our decision here:
1. "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party
not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. !l

relief and

"[T]o satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing,
litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an
and
a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
or redress the claimed injury."

3. "[A] citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental
enactment where the injury is one suffered alike by all
and
taxpayers of the jurisdiction."
Id. at 641 778 P.2d at 763.

In the federal courts, a three-part test governs whether a dispute presents a "case or
controversy" sufficient for Article III standing: ( 1) "the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in
a legally protected interest

is (a) concrete

and (b)

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) "there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of'; and (3)

BRIEF

must be likely, as opposed to

m

a

" Idaho courts and the federal courts also require a causal connection between the
challenged action and the injury. The plaintiff's injuries must be different than injuries suffered
by all citizens and taxpayers in the jurisdiction.

2. "Competitor standing" flows directly from standing principles applied by Idaho
courts.
The federal courts did not create a new body of law or depart from established standing
to formulate the rule of "competitor standing.
pu•vc.-,,vu

V~<<va.,r,

The rule flowed directly from the

of the universally applied standing rules to facts that showed government action

injury to a plaintiff, different from injuries suffered by

"competitor standing" to complain of the

action in granting a tax subsidy to Employers'

competitor, Paylocity. The lower court correctly noted that Martin v.
248 P.3d 1243 (2011), stated that Idaho courts have not
standing.

and taxpayers in

County, 150 Idaho
recognized "competitor

But the Martin facts are not remotely similar to the present case, and Martin is

therefore readily distinguished. First, 1vfartin was a challenge to a zoning amendment applicable
to undeveloped properties throughout the County. Martin argued that upzoning other properties
placed his property at a competitive disadvantage because it increased the supply of developable
properties. The Court in Martin noted:
None of the parcels that Martin ov.111s -- or
interests in -- were downzoned as a
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O\\TIS,

same manner that he would have been able to prior to the 2007 and
2008 zoning amendments.
Martin cites to no authority in support of his argument that a
comprehensive county-wide chai1.ge m zomng designations
(wherein some parcels of land receive a higher zoning density
classification than they previously enjoyed) constitutes an injury to
a property owner, absent some resultant specific and traceable
harm. Martin argues that the upzoning of approximately 20,000
acres of property in Camas County will decrease the value of his
property for development, because of the increase in supply.
Martin contends that Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise
Auditorium District, 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624 (2005), stands
for the proposition that an increase in competition may constitute a
particularized injury.

Id at 513, 748 P3d at 1248.
In

present case, the agency action is not action directed at all businesses or

public

Paylocity,
competitor. Employers has not alleged that goverument action has altered the marketplace
increasing competition generally and equally for everyone, but that the government
subsidized Employers' competitor so that Paylocity can compete

"F.'-'-'"·""

Employers

an

advantageous position artificially created by the State. This is a particularized injury unique to
Employers.
With regard to the lower court's statement that competitor standing exists only when a
successful challenge will set up an absolute bar to competition, Employers asserts that a
successful challenge to the EAC's grant of a tax credit to Paylocity will achieve the end that
Paylocity would have to

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

with Employers on an equal

m

noted would

D'Alene Tribe v. Denney,

169, 2015 Idaho

demonstrated a "distinct and palpable injury" sufficient to confer

standing.
In that case, the Court reiterated the Martin v. Camas County holding that "increased
competition alone is insufficent to confer standing," but then clarified that if the tribe had pointed
to facts "to show actual or imminent losses of profit or rights greater than the average citizen,"
the tribe would have demonstrated a "distinct and palpable" injury sufficient to confer standing.
The rationale applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe case is
consistent with the "competitor standing" rules formulated by the United

Court

in Clinton and followed by other federal courts in Sherley and US Telecom.
In Clinton, the Court held that Snake River Farms had standing to bring a claim
challenging action by the executive branch of the federal government that placed it at a
disadvantage with its competitors. In the present case, the executive branch of the State of Idaho,
the Department of Commerce, has taken action that has put Employers at an economic
disadvantage with one of its competitors.
In both Clinton and this case, the legislative branch of government has created a tax
benefit that was supposed to be available to all companies. In this case, the Idaho Legislature
invested the Department

Commerce with so much discretion in the administration of the law

that its actions exceed its constitutional authority.
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granting

a

III.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Employers has standing to bring this action, and this Court
should reverse the decision of the district court, and remand this action for consideration of the
merits of Employers' claims.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of January, 2017.
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